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Abstract This paper explores the relationship between federalism and individual
liberty. It is shown that a complete treatment of the relationship between federalism
and individual liberty should consider two countervailing effects. On the one hand, a
federalist structure enhances individual liberty by enlarging the choice set of the
citizens. On the other hand, however, a federalist system leads to institutional
diversity, a fact that per se leads to higher exit costs, which a citizen must bear if he
or she decides to change jurisdictions. This effect on individual liberty is a negative
one, since a consequence of every increase in the exit costs is a decrease of indi-
vidual liberty. The optimum range of diversity of jurisdictions is shown to lie where
the two effects counterbalance each other.
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1 Introduction
Federalism as a constitutional structure aims at splitting political power among
federal, state and local governments, so that the probability that a single majority
can impose its will on all levels of government is ruled out. As Madison put it in his
classical formulation: ‘‘In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people
is submitted to the administration of a single government; and usurpations are
guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate
departments. In the compound government of America, the power surrendered by
the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion
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allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a
double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will
control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself’’ (The
Federalist Papers 1961, No. 51, Madison, p. 323).
Federalism as a constitutional structure provides a system of ‘‘checks and
balances’’ which in the long-run promotes the liberty of individuals of the respective
polity. Federalism is a constitutionally anchored constraint to political power and to
the possibility of curtailing individual liberty. Hence, a main argument for
federalism is that it secures individual liberty.
Though the vital importance of federalism for securing individual liberty is
broadly acknowledged,1 the exact relationship between the two has been insuffi-
ciently analyzed. The theories of dual, cooperative, and competitive federalism,
though quite fully developed, have not provided any coherent view of the
mechanism for how federalism influences individual liberty. It is mainly other
aspects that are regularly discussed (e.g., Karmis and Norman 2005), like the
relationship between federalism and multiculturalism, democracy or fiscal policies;
but there is literally no work highlighting the mechanism of how a federalist system
affects individual liberty.2
In this paper, I shall provide a description of the mechanism that links federalism
and individual liberty, paying due attention to the most important effects of a
federalist structure on the liberty of the citizens. Much of the literature on the issue
is of a normative flavor, trying to answer the question how the political system
ought to react so that individual preferences can be best satisfied. I am going to
proceed in a positive way. My problem is how a federal system will, under certain
plausible assumptions, affect the liberty of the individual; in other words, I want to
investigate what will be the reaction of the constituency to a federalist political
system and how this reaction will influence the individual liberty. Liberal thinkers
(in the original, European sense of the term) are concerned with the problem of
responsiveness; my concern in this article is to show the complex influence on the
individual liberty that emerges by allowing multiple governments to offer diverse
institutional arrangements to citizens.
2 Arguments that link federalism to individual liberty
There is a series of arguments that link federalism to individual liberty, some of
them already contained in the Federalist Papers and some of them suggested in
contemporary discussions. The core issue is what Riker (1964) has called the
fundamental dilemma of federalism, i.e., how to have a central government that is
strong enough to provide a check on the lower level governments, but is not so
strong that it overwhelms the states. The first way that lower level governments can
1 See the remark of Elazar (1987, p. 91): ‘‘The central interest of true federalism in all its species is
liberty’’.
2 See the remark of Chemerinsky (2001, p. 929): ‘‘The point is that none of the traditional justifications
for federalism explain why it is likely to enhance liberty nor is it ever explained why federalism is needed
to secure liberty’’.
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check the central government is laid out in Federalist Nr. 24, 25, and 46: the greater
loyalty that citizens would tend to feel to their states than to the federal center would
tend to check any move to despotism by the center, in extreme cases even through
armed resistance. A second way was already proposed by de Montesquieu (1748/
1989, p. 132): ‘‘If a sedition occurs in one of the members of the confederation, the
others can pacify it. If some abuses are introduced somewhere, they are corrected by
the healthy parts’’. According to this argument it is the other lower level
governments that can check any move towards abuse by a lower level government,
without the central government engaging in any correction. The third way is
described by the so—called republican guarantee clause of the US Constitution
(Article IV, Sect. 4): ‘‘The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion;
and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature
cannot be convened) against domestic Violence’’. In other words liberty is protected
by means of a federal check on the lower level governments.
Levy (2007, p. 309), presenting the three arguments above, speaks of
‘‘mechanisms by which the founding generation imagined that federalism might
enhance liberty’’. However, though these arguments are important and probably
valid, it is a real stretch to speak of mechanisms in this context. The notion of
mechanism is at the center stage of the discussions of casuality and explanation in
the philosophy of science, and it is increasingly acknowledged that a scientific
explanation of a phenomenon can only be provided if a causal mechanism is
specified (Machamer et al. 2000, P. Machamer, 2008, unpublished manuscript,
Knight 2009). The links between federalism and liberty sketched above are nothing
more than the first argumentative steps towards the construction of a more
comprehensive mechanism illuminating the relationship yet to be developed.
The same is true for the contemporary discussions of federalism. The most
frequently repeated argument in favor of federalism is that states or local
governments are closer to the people and thus more likely to be responsive to their
needs. Vaubel (1995) offers, for example, two justifications for a federalist
structure: (1) that regional preferences differ; and (2) that competition among
governments protects the freedom of the individual. His argument is representative
for the standard perspective that the greater responsiveness to regional preferences
is ipso facto a guarantee for liberty. Shapiro (1995) also suggests that in principle
the smaller the area governed, the more responsive the government will be to the
preferences of the constituency, and thus the better it will be able to protect
individual liberty.3 However, as Chemerinsky (2001, p. 927) sharply observes:
‘‘[T]his premise is highly questionable; it assumes that popular sentiment is likely to
be rights progressive rather than rights regressive. To the extent that voters at the
state and local level prefer rights regressive legislation—or more likely a rule that
abuses a particular minority group—greater responsiveness increases the dangers of
government tyranny. In other words, the substantive result of decreasing tyranny
3 See Shapiro (1995, p. 91f.): ‘‘[O]ne of the stronger arguments for a decentralized political structure is
that, to the extent that the electorate is small, and elected representatives are thus more immediately
accountable to individuals and their concerns, government is brought closer to the people, and democratic
ideals are more fully realized’’.
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will not always be best achieved by the process approach of maximizing electoral
responsiveness; indeed, the reverse might well be the result’’.
Buchanan (1995, p. 259), for his part, suggests ‘‘that a coherent classical liberal
must be generally supportive of federal political structures, because any division of
authority must, necessarily, tend to limit the potential range of political coercion’’.
In his theory of competitive federalism, he elaborates on the prospects for exit as
constraints on political control over the individual and introduces, thus, a very
important analytical category—the exit option—in the analysis of the relationship
between federalism and individual liberty.4 The theory known as ‘‘market
preserving federalism’’ (Weingast 1995; Qian and Weingast 1997) suggests ways
that a federalist system can be designed in this way in order to effectively preserve
markets and provide incentives for long-run economic development (Mantzavinos
2001). Other theoretical developments in this tradition analyze the ways that the
institutions of federalism can be sustained, stressing that the chances of survival of a
federalist system crucially depend on federal structures being self-enforcing, i.e.,
they depend on the center and the states having incentives to fulfill their obligations
within the limits of federal bargains (de Figueiredo and Weingast 2005). While
these contributions are very valuable indeed, they do not provide any insights into
the working properties of a mechanism that links federalism and individual liberty. I
will undertake such an attempt in what follows.
3 Federalism and direct individual liberty
Federalism as a constitutional principle can only be effective if enough power is
ceded to a number of regulative authorities, which can use it in order to offer
different institutional arrangements. Whether these be states or local authorities, the
main idea of federalism consists of numerous jurisdictions making decisions on
public issues and providing diverse institutional rules to the citizens of the
respective jurisdictions. Thus, federalism permits jurisdictions to offer alternative
packages of public goods and of legal rules for the organization of different aspects
of the public and private life of the constituency.
Characteristic of federal polities is their noncentralized structure. The powers of
government are diffused among many centers rather than being concentrated in a
single center. Noncentralization is different from decentralization. In a decentral-
ized system there exists a central authority that can decentralize or recentralize
according to its desires, whereas ‘‘in a noncentralized political system, power is so
diffused that it cannot be legitimately centralized or concentrated without breaking
the structure and spirit of the constitution’’ (Elazar 1987, p. 34f).
This noncentralization implies a plurality of jurisdictions within a political
system. For federalism, the existence of plurality of authorities is decisive.
Normally in the literature, as well as in accord with common sense, a federal
4 ‘‘Exit’’ has been sufficiently used, of course, in the theory of competitive federalism originating in the
classic Tiebout (1956) article and more generally in the economics of federalism (for a collection see
Ribstein and Kobayashi 2007). However, this literature pays no attention to the question how the
possibility of exiting a jurisdiction affects individual liberty.
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political system is associated with a plurality of authorities. This plurality of
jurisdictions can lead alternatively, dependent on different factors, either to a
homogeneous or a diverse political landscape. The existence of plural authorities
might result in offering either homogeneous or diverse institutional rules to a
constituency. Although it is possible that the existence of a plurality of authorities
may lead to entirely homogeneous institutional rules, empirically it does not seem to
be the rule.5 What occurs more often is that a plurality of jurisdictions legislating in
a complex social world will provide diverse institutional rules. The most interesting
case empirically is, thus, that plurality will lead to diversity. Hence, I shall abstract
from the first case and I shall assume that empirically the essential characteristic of a
political system based on a federalist structure is that diverse institutional rules are
made available by numerous jurisdictions. Therefore, when I speak of federalism in
this paper, I shall mainly mean that local governments offer various ‘‘package
deals’’ or mixes of services or institutional arrangements to their constituents. This
diversity per se has always been seen as protective of the individual liberty of the
citizens6: What is interesting in our context is how this diversity is perceived by any
single individual in a polity, i.e., the effects of federalism for any individual citizen
of a polity.
This effect obviously has something to do with the individual freedom of choice.
If alternative institutional arrangements are offered to an individual, then he has the
possibility of choosing the one that he finds best, i.e., the one that satisfies more
completely his desires. The diversity of institutional arrangements per se enhances
the alternatives open to the individual citizen. His degree of freedom is augmented,
because in a federal system he can choose to live in the jurisdiction that offers him
the best set of institutional rules. This is the positive formulation of the effect of
federalism on individual liberty: diversity broadens the possible set of choices of
jurisdictions for every citizen. But one may also formulate the issue in a negative
way. Using the familiar distinction between ‘‘exit’’ and ‘‘voice’’ (Hirschman 1970),
every individual can change the jurisdiction under which he lives, if he is
dissatisfied with the one he currently lives under. In other words, he can exit the
jurisdiction that does not provide the set of institutional arrangements that he
approves of. Stated in these terms, diversity of jurisdictions and institutional
arrangements guarantees the existence of exit options for any dissatisfied citizen,
and thus enhances his individual liberty.
Every member of an organization normally possesses two options with which he
can show his dissatisfaction: ‘‘exit’’ and ‘‘voice’’. The effect of these two different
5 An anonymous referee has pointed out that decentralization does not encourage very much institutional
diversity. He referred to the cases of the US, Canada, and Australia which are regarded to be three of the
four most decentralized federal systems, but their state governments have relatively little diversity. I have
no space here to discuss the empirical literature on decentralization and heterogeneity (see Mueller 2003,
Chap. 10.5 for a competent review), and I would only like to make two remarks. First, decentralization
must be distinguished from noncentralization. Second, since I am primarily interested in developing a
theoretical argument, I, of course, do not claim its validity for all cases, but only for those for which it is
empirically applicable.
6 Already Madison noted: ‘‘In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the
different powers of government, which to a certain extend is admitted on all hands to be essential to the
preservation of liberty[…]’’ (The Federalist Papers 1961, No. 51, Madison, p. 321).
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decisions of individual members of organizations is to serve as recuperation
mechanisms for organizational slack by showing the discontent with realized
policies. But although ‘‘voice’’ can be effective in increasing responsiveness to the
wishes of the members of organizations, it is the exit-option which is most powerful
in signalling to the management of an organization or the government of a polity
that members or citizens are dissatisfied with it.7 In my discussion of the
relationship between federalism and individual liberty, it is ‘‘exit’’ that constitutes
an increase in liberty rather than ‘‘voice’’. And the possibility of ‘‘exit’’ is given only
in a federal political system with diverse jurisdictions.
I want to call this relationship between diversity of jurisdictions and the freedom
of the individual to choose among jurisdictions the direct effect of federalism on
individual liberty. Accordingly, I want to call this kind of liberty direct individual
liberty (DIL). The respective function of DIL can be written as:
DIL = f Divð Þ; dDIL
dDiv
[ 0
where DIL is direct individual liberty, Div is diversity of jurisdictions available for
individuals to choose. It is important that the first derivative of the function is
greater than zero, meaning that, as the diversity of jurisdictions increases, the DIL
also increases.
This simple function is represented geometrically in Fig. 1. On the ordinate the
DIL is presented; and on the abscissa the diversity of jurisdictions is shown. The
curve of DIL will slope upward throughout all of its range, showing the direct effect
of federalism on individual liberty. The more jurisdictions offer different
institutional settings, the greater the range of options for any individual, and thus
the greater the possibility for an individual to choose among them. The zero point of
this function will show the case of a citizen living within one jurisdiction and having
no option to leave it.8
4 Diversity of jurisdictions and exit costs
So far we have discussed the impact of the diversity of jurisdictions on the freedom
of the individual to choose where he wants to live. Obviously, a crucial factor in the
above analysis is the assumed mobility of the individuals. In order for a citizen to be
able to realize the benefits of the existence of numerous jurisdictions offering
diverse institutional arrangements, he must also avail himself of the respective
mobility to move from one jurisdiction to another. This mobility of the individual is
7 Hirschman (1970, p. 83) stresses the fact that although prima facie exit and voice are alternative
mechanisms, their relationship is more complex. ‘‘Now it appears that the effectiveness of the voice
mechanism is strengthened by the possibility of exit. The willingness to develop and use the voice
mechanism is reduced by exit, but the ability to use it with effect is increased by it’’.
8 At this point it should be mentioned that no assumptions are made about the second derivative of the
function, i.e., how the curve looks exactly. I have used a linear interpretation only because of its
simplicity. The important fact in this and the other figures is only that the relationship is a positive or a
negative one.
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enhanced whenever the exit costs are low, i.e., whenever he can move across
jurisdictions without having to bear high personal costs. And in an opposite manner,
his mobility is diminished whenever the exit costs that he has to bear in the case of
making the exit-decision are high.
Hence in this context, it becomes important to provide a relationship between the
diversity of jurisdictions, i.e., federalism, and the exit costs that the citizen must
bear. (In the next section I will analyze how these exit costs are linked to individual
liberty.) How does the plurality of authorities exerting discretionary political power
affect the decision of a citizen to exit from the jurisdiction under which he lives?
In stating the link between diversity of jurisdictions and DIL, we have not defined
precisely what we mean when saying jurisdictions are diverse. Since the interesting
issue is only the existence of diverse political authorities offering different policy
packages and increasing per se the freedom of choice for individuals, the exact
meaning of such diversity of jurisdictions has not been developed. I want now to define
the diversity of jurisdictions as it appears to an individual as the difference between the
new behavioral routines that he has to get accustomed to in the new jurisdictions minus
the behavioral routines of the individual within his initial jurisdiction.
For my purposes, this definition covers sufficiently the diversity of political
authorities, i.e., how the plurality of jurisdictions affects the individual life of the
citizens. When an individual lives within one jurisdiction, his behavior is channelled
by the respective institutional setting. The jurisdiction, by providing rules ranging
from healthcare, welfare, and education to transport, air pollution, and town
planning, affects directly and indirectly the private life of any citizen. If an
individual moves to a new jurisdiction that provides different sets of rules, it is
obvious that the individual must first get accustomed to it, before he can lead a
happy life. For every citizen, the diversity of jurisdictions takes the form of different
behaviors that an individual must adopt if he decides to exit from one jurisdiction
and live in a new one.
For his exit-decision, two sets of factors are important for an individual: (1) the
informal rules, i.e., of culture, morals, language, etc.; and, (2) the diversity of formal
rules. Obviously, it is very difficult for an individual to leave the jurisdiction in which
he lives and move to another one if, for example, another language is spoken in the
new one. Cultural diversity increases the exit costs of any individual and very often
impedes mobility. As David Hume stated it: ‘‘Can we seriously say, that a poor
DIL
0
Direct
Individual
Liberty
Diversity
of Jurisdictions
Fig. 1 Relationship between diversity of jurisdictions and direct individual liberty
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peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave his country, when he knows no foreign
language or manners, and lives from day to day, by the small wages which he
acquires? We may as well assert, that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents
to the dominion of the master; though he was carried on board while asleep, and must
leap into the ocean, and perish, the moment he leaves her’’ (Hume 1907, p. 451).
Although it is very interesting to explore the influence of cultural diversity on
exit costs of individuals, if one wants to explain the impact of federalism as a
constitutional structure on liberty, then only the diversity of formal rules is relevant.
The influence of culture on the exit-decision of the individual would blur our
analytical argument for the moment; it is the impact of formal rules, i.e.,
legislations, decrees, etc. on exit costs that we are concerned with, because a federal
system consists of the diversity of such formal rules. And since cultural diversity is
not a constitutive element of a federalist principle, its influence will be regarded in
the next analytical step (Sect. 8).
Concentrating thus on the impact that the diversity of formal rules has on the
individual decision of exiting, the following causal relationship seems obvious: the
greater the diversity of formal rules offered by state or local authorities, the greater
the change of behavioral routines needed for the individual in case of exiting from
his initial jurisdiction, i.e., the higher are the exit costs that he has to bear. But why
and in what form do different formal rules effect a change of behavior for which
adaptation costs are to be born?
As we have stated before, institutions can affect individual behavior in an
indirect, but quite powerful, way. When a state or local authority with political
power enacts legislation, at the same time it provides the framework within which
citizens of the respective jurisdiction can act. Formal rules are the primary
restriction in the individual calculus of choice, because normally a consequence of
breaking of these is more or less severe punishment in monetary or non-monetary
terms. In other words, legal rules directly affect the options open to an individual
and thus indirectly affect his choices and corresponding behavior. The impact of
public life on individuals is always one created through rules enacted by the
political authority and one that constrains the choice options of the individuals.
What is of importance to us now is to introduce the temporal perspective into the
analysis. Since even the most mobile citizens do not change jurisdictions very often,
but only a limited number of times throughout their lives, it is not only the impact of
formal rules on choice that is to be elucidated, but also the impact on the long-run
behavior of individuals. This issue is stated sufficiently by Vanberg and Kerber
(1994, p. 205): ‘‘When residents are dissatisfied with ‘their’ government, they can
escape that government only by moving into a different jurisdiction, a transaction
that is in general significantly more costly than changing sellers in market exchange.
There are potentially considerable exit costs involved, in particular in the form of
‘sunk capital’ that has to be given up or is devalued significantly by the change in
residential location. This includes as a major component accumulated knowledge,
skills and expertise that are adopted to the particular environment, but have
comparatively little value in alternative environments’’.
Institutions, understood as the rules of the game, channel the long-run behavior of
citizens (Mantzavinos et al. 2004). Formal rules define the restrictions for individual
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behavior and in this way lead the inclinations and skills of individuals into a certain
direction. This means that to a great degree people form their habits according to the
institutional framework within which they live. But habits, in turn, possess self-
perpetuating dynamics. As Marshall put it: ‘‘[…] the more good music a man hears,
the stronger is his taste for it likely to become’’ (Marshall 1920, p. 79). What lies
behind this statement is that the more a person is accustomed to act in a certain way,
the higher is the probability that he will experience a greater pleasure when acting in
the same way in the future.
Obviously it is not the process of habit formation that concerns us here, but the fact
that once one has acquired a habit, one will get utility by practicing it. Rawls speaks in a
similar way of a general psychological law which he calls the ‘‘Aristotelian Principle’’:
‘‘other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their
innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is
realized, or the greater its complexity. The intuitive idea here is that the human beings
take more pleasure in doing something as they become more proficient at it, and of two
activities they do equally well, they prefer the one calling on a larger repertoire of more
intricate and subtle discriminations’’ (Rawls 1971, p. 426).9 The economists Stigler
and Becker stated the same law in a somewhat more technical manner (Stigler and
Becker 1977). The main idea is that something like a ‘‘consumption capital’’ exists
which is formed during the period in which one is involved in acting in a specific way
(in Marshall’s example, this would be listening to good music). Once acquired, this
human ‘‘consumption capital’’ has as an effect that every time one is exercising one’s
habit, one must devote less energy to it in comparison to one’s other activities. This
means that the ‘‘shadow price’’ of, for example, listening to music is lower than
spending one’s time on other activities. This cheapness of exercising one’s habit due to
accumulated skill and experience provides an incentive for the individual and finally
leads him to exercise it more frequently in the future, an insight that is supported by
current psychological research (Anderson 2005, Chap. 9, Mantzavinos 2005, p. 121ff).
After the formulation of this psychological law, whether in terms of psychology,
as an Aristotelian Principle, or in terms of economics, the relevant link for us must be
obvious: if formal rules serve as restrictions to individual behavior, and if once habits
are formed so as to tend to perpetuate themselves, then formal (legal) rules affect the
long-run individual behavior by channelling it in certain ways. This means then that
the individual, whenever he possesses the choice to live under different formal rules,
i.e., jurisdictions, must always reckon with a consequent compulsory change of his
habits and behavioral routines. This, in turn, is equivalent to psychological costs,
which every individual who moves from one jurisdiction to another must bear.10 If
9 What is important in this context is ‘‘that enjoyment and pleasure are not always by any means the
result of returning to a healthy or normal state, or of making up deficiencies; rather many kinds of
pleasure and enjoyment arise when we exercise our faculties’’ (Rawls 1971, p. 426).
10 ‘‘Regardless of the level of government, exit entails cost, not only economically but, perhaps even
more importantly, psychologically. Normally, an individual feels an attachment to or part of the
community in which he is born and raised. It is where his friends are. He identifies with it. It is ‘his’
community. He is a member of it and feels loyalty to it. It is where his ‘roots’ are. It is ‘home’. Thus, exit,
like revolution, will not occur ‘upon every little mismanagement of public affairs’ or disagreement over
public policy’’. (Osterfeld 1989, p. 171).
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one labels these costs as ‘‘exit costs’’, then a positive casual relationship exists
between diversity of formal rules, i.e., jurisdictions, and exit costs for the mobile
individual.
We may write the exit costs function as:
EC = g Divð Þ; with dEC
dDiv
[ 0
where EC is exit costs of individual, Div is diversity of jurisdictions available for
the individual to choose. The first derivative of the exit costs function is positive,
meaning that as the diversity of jurisdictions increases, the exit costs for the
individual also increase.
The exit cost function is represented geometrically in Fig. 2. On the ordinate the
exit costs of the individual are represented; on the abscissa the diversity of
jurisdictions is shown. The curve of exit costs will slope upward throughout all of its
range, showing the positive effect of federalism on the exit costs of the individual.
The more the jurisdictions offering different institutional settings, the greater the
pains for an individual to adapt himself to the new institutional environment if he
decides to exit and thus, the higher the indivdiual’s exit costs are. The zero-point
illustrates the case of no practical diversity among jurisdictions, i.e., the case of a
centralized political system; in this case naturally the exit costs are zero because
there is no exit-opportunity.
5 Exit costs and indirect individual liberty
So far we have stated the casual relationship between the diversity of jurisdictions
and the exit costs of the individual. The greater the diversity, the higher the exit
costs for an individual who decides to change jurisdiction. But since we are
primarily interested in the effects of federalism on the freedom of the individual, the
problem of the relationship between exit costs and individual liberty arises.
Obviously, this relationship is a negative one. The higher the exit costs for any
citizen, the more difficult the decision to change jurisdiction and thus, in effect, the
less his individual liberty becomes. The psychological costs of adaptation to a new
institutional environment function as an impediment to the individual freedom to
EC
0
Exit-
Costs
Diversity
of Jurisdictions
Fig. 2 Relationship between diversity of jurisdictions and exit-costs
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choose the jurisdiction under which he wants to live. This is the indirect effect of
diversity of jurisdictions imposed through higher exit costs on the individual liberty.
Accordingly, I want to call this kind of liberty indirect individual liberty (IIL). The
respective function of IIL can be written as:
IIL = h ECð Þ; with dIIL
dEC
\0
where IIL is indirect individual liberty, EC is exit costs of the individual. The first
derivative of the IIL function is negative, meaning that as the exit costs of the
individual increases, his IIL decreases.
The IIL function is presented geometrically in Fig. 3. On the ordinate the IIL is
presented; on the abscissa the exit costs are shown. The curve of IIL will slope
downwards throughout all of its range, showing the negative effect of exit costs on
IIL.
6 Diversity of jurisdictions and indirect individual liberty
In the preceding section we have stated the negative relationship between exit costs
and IIL. This casual relationship holds, irrespective of what it is that causes exit
costs. As we have mentioned in Sect. 4, high exit costs can obviously be caused by
cultural diversity between jurisdictions, such as different languages, different
standards of behavior, etc. But as we are concerned here with the impact of
federalism as a constitutional system on the individual liberty, what matters is how
exit costs caused by the application of a federalist political system affect individual
liberty. In other words, what is important is the impact of the diversity of
jurisdictions on exit costs, and through those costs, on the IIL.
It should be obvious that this causal link between federalism, i.e., diversity of
jurisdictions, and IIL is a negative one. We have seen that a consequence of the
diversity of jurisdictions available for the individual to choose from is that his or her
exit costs increase. And a consequence of every increase in the exit costs is a
decrease in the IIL. Thus an overall consequence of the diversity of jurisdictions is a
decrease of IIL.
0
Indirect
Individual
Liberty
Exit-Costs
IIL
Fig. 3 Relationship between exit-costs and indirect individual liberty
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If we take a look at our functions, the above means that since diversity of
jurisdictions causes exit costs and exit costs are linked to IIL, we have the case of a
composition of two functions
IIL = h ECð Þand EC = g Divð Þ:
The relationship can be written as:
IIL = h g Divð Þ½ 
Since the first derivative of IIL is negative, i.e., dIIL
dEC
\0 and the first derivative of EC
is positive, i.e., dEC
dDiv
[ 0 the derivative of the function IIL = h [g (Div)] must be
negative, since:
dIIL
dDiv
¼ dIIL
dEC
dEC
dDiv
and with
dILL
dEC
\0 and
dEC
dDiv
[ 0
it follows that dIIL
dDiv
\0.
In other words, the slope of the function of IIL in relation to the diversity of
jurisdictions is negative. This relationship is presented geometrically in Fig. 4. This
figure merely presents Figs. 2 and 3 together in one, so that the intermediate link of
the exit costs is omitted. On the ordinate the IIL is represented; on the abscissa the
diversity of jurisdictions is shown. The IIL curve will slope downward throughout
its whole range, showing the negative effect of the diversity of jurisdictions
(through exit costs) on the IIL.
7 Federalism, direct and indirect individual liberty
So far in our exploration of the complex relationship between federalism and
individual liberty, we have put forward two lines of argument, a direct and an
indirect one. The direct argument states the positive impact of federalism, i.e.,
diversity of jurisdictions, per se on individual liberty. Since diversity broadens the
possible set of choice among jurisdictions for the citizen, there is a direct effect of
federalism on his individual liberty. This is more or less, explicitly or implicitly, the
0
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Individual
Liberty
Diversity
of Jurisdictions
IIL
Fig. 4 Relationship between diversity of jurisdictions and indirect individual liberty
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main argument for federalism stated in the literature by the advocates of a
noncentralized political system.
Although this line of reasoning is definitely right, it is nevertheless incomplete. A
full treatment of the problem of the impact of federalism on individual liberty must
also contain the indirect effect of federalism on individual liberty. This indirect line
of argument concerns the effect institutional diversity has of increasing the degree
of difficulty a citizen has to move from one jurisdiction to another. A consequence
of this fact, which is an unintended result of a federalist organization of a polity, is a
decrease in individual liberty. This effect, which is an indirect one because it is
neither designed nor planned by the constitutional designers, causes a diminution of
what I have called the IIL. It is, in a certain way, a quasi-automatic effect, caused
and enhanced by the peculiarity of the human nature to adapt well to prevailing
institutional settings and thus to find it difficult to re-adapt to new ones.
How, then, are these two effects of federalism, the direct and the indirect one, to
be best handled theoretically? To answer this question, the geometrical figures
worked out in the paper will be an aid. In Fig. 1 we have shown the direct effect of
federalism, i.e., of the diversity of jurisdictions, on individual liberty. In Fig. 4 we
have shown (by summing up Figs. 2, 3) the indirect relationship of federalism on
individual liberty. If we now put together Figs. 1 and 4 in one diagram, we then will
have the total effect of federalism on individual liberty.
In Fig. 5 the curves of both DIL and IIL are depicted—namely, at the point Op
on the abscissa, where the two points intersect the optimum degree of diversity of
jurisdictions is presented. At this point the positive and negative effects of
federalism on individual liberty are counterbalanced. Since the geometrical
representation of the problem is only appropriate for the purpose of illustration, it
is obvious that there is not only one optimum degree of diversity, but rather a wide
range of optima—all the points between A and B on the graph.
At point A, for example, the case of a more limited federalist political system is
presented. The direct effect on individual liberty is thus rather small, whereas, since
only a small amount of diversity of institutional arrangements is offered to the
citizens, the exit costs are low and thus the indirect effect on individual liberty is
quite great. In the case of a more radicalized federalism (point B), the inverse
phenomena appear. The direct effect is great, while exit costs are high and the
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indirect effect is small. Hence, from a normative point of view, if a constitutional
federalist design is to be implemented, the federalism most conducive to individual
liberty is a moderate one.
OA and BZ represent the federalist structures which, from the viewpoint of their
effect on individual liberty, are less appropriate. I want to call them the cases of
ineffective federalism. They show the cases of centralized federalism and radical
federalism. They are both nonoptimal because either the direct or the indirect effect
dominates and thus federalism misses its primary aim—to secure and enhance
individual liberty. This becomes obvious when one examines the two extreme cases:
a centralist political system without federalism, and a radical federalist political
system. In the first case, the fact that citizens have to bear zero exit costs is
obviously of no consequence. Why should it matter that the citizen enjoys great IIL
when this is thoroughly ineffective since he does not have the possibility of
choosing among jurisdictions? And in the other extreme case, that of radical
federalism, it is likewise inconsequential that citizens have the possibility of
choosing among every thinkable jurisdiction. Why should it matter that the citizen
enjoys great DIL when this is thoroughly ineffective since de facto (because of the
peculiarity of human nature discussed above) he is not capable of using it?
Therefore, these two extremes present cases of ineffective federalism.11
8 Mobility, federalism and individual liberty
So far we have explored the impact of the diversity of jurisdictions on individual
liberty. By stating the two effects, the direct and the indirect one, we have not
explicitly considered how individual mobility would affect the analysis. In other
words, we have not investigated how differences in mobility and/or adaptability
between individuals influence the working of federalism. In Sect. 3 we stressed the
fact that in order to analyze the impact of federalism on individual liberty only the
diversity of formal rules were important. After having reached our theoretical
results, we can, in a further analytical step, explore the adaptability of individuals as
a further determinant of individual liberty. The question in this section is thus: under
conditions of different mobility of citizens, how is the optimum degree of
federalism modified in respect to its impact on individual liberty?
The comparison between United States and Europe is interesting in this respect.
In the United States the citizens are very mobile in different respects and change
jurisdictions quite frequently.12 Obviously, if we compare the case of the United
11 The results of my analysis are hence different to those of Osterfeld (1989). He advocates radical
federalism as a means of enhancing responsiveness of government without taking into consideration the
indirect effect; he thus reduces the complexity of the problem. Only if both effects, the direct and indirect,
are seen, can we reach a complete treatment of the problem of the appropriate extent of federalism.
12 Dye (1990, p. 16) refers to the fact that between 1980 and 1985, 40% of Americans changed their
residence, and nearly 10 percent moved to a different state. And Walzer stresses the fact that in the United
States the individuals are continually in motion. He speaks of the four mobilities: (1) geographic, (2)
social, (3) marital, and (4) political. In respect to political mobility Walzer remarks: ‘‘Loyalty to leaders,
movements, parties, clubs and urban machines seems to decline rapidly as place and social standing and
family membership become less central in the shaping of personal identity. Liberal citizens stand outside
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States with that of a prospective European Union organized as one polity, the
mobility of the citizens in the latter is much lower. In our example, regarding only
language, it is much easier for an American to move from one state to another than
for a European. Cultural differences, in this case language, increase the exit costs of
Europeans, making it more difficult to move to a new jurisdiction. An English
citizen can move more easily to the USA than a French citizen; and an Austrian can
move more easily to Germany than a Portuguese. The crucial factor is obviously
cultural homogeneity: the effects of a federalist structure in a culturally homoge-
neous polity will be different from those in a polity with cultural differences
between the local jurisdictions.
This result can be stated as following: in a culturally homogeneous polity,
federalism will work better to secure individual liberty than in a culturally
heterogeneous polity. This will be so because cultural homogeneity implies the
enhanced mobility of citizens; and greater mobility means lower exit costs for any
given federalist structure. Thus the indirect effect on liberty will be greater when the
mobility or adaptability of the citizens is greater.
Let us see how the analysis can be presented in a graph where the enhanced
mobility or adaptability of the citizens is assumed. In Fig. 6 the curve of IIL is
shifted to the right (IIL0). This is so because, for a given diversity of jurisdictions,
their exit costs are lower due to greater mobility of the citizens. In other words,
because—for some external reasons (i.e., cultural homogeneity)—the citizen is
more mobile, he or she is more prone to make the exit-decision, regardless of the
degree of federalism in the political system. Since the individual’s exit costs are thus
lower, and according to the function IIL = h (EC), the IIL will be greater.
Geometrically this is equivalent to a shift of the IIL-curve to the right.
The new optimum point—in this case, of cultural homogeneity of the polity or of
greater per se mobility of the citizens (which is the same)—is Op0, which is to the
right of the old optimum point Op. This means that federalism in a mobile society
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Footnote 12 continued
all political organizations and then choose the one that best serves their ideals or interests. They are,
ideally, independent voters, that is, people who move around; they choose for themselves rather than
voting as their parents did, and they choose freshly each time rather than repeating themselves’’ (Walzer
1990, p. 12).
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may be more radical, i.e., the sets of institutional arrangements might vary more.
The application of the same degree of federalism in a case where the mobility of
citizens is greater can lead to an enhancement of individual liberty compared to the
case in which there is low mobility (IL1 compared to IL0). In our example this
would mean that the same federalist political system when applied in the United
States and in Europe would lead to a greater increase in individual liberty in the
United States than in Europe.
But why is this so? Apparently because the European citizens perceive the
diversity of jurisdictions and institutional arrangements as an impediment rather than
as a chance to better their lives. A direct result of the analysis for Europe would then
be that the more the cultural integration of the different European people proceeds,
the more beneficial will be the effects of a federalist system on the individual liberty.
9 Some limitations
The analysis has a series of limitations. The most serious one is due to the way
liberty is conceptualized and the subsequent use of equations and diagrams, as if
liberty were a well-defined variable amenable to such an analysis. The standard
analysis of federalism uses the formal machinery of the public choice theory; it is
largely based on the use of the concept of utility, which makes the respective models
largely testable. Since my analysis focuses on liberty rather than utility, it is not
possible to draw on the large literature in the economics of federalism and political
science that formally analyzes the working properties of federalist systems.
However, admitting the somehow messy character of transforming the concept of
liberty to an analytical variable, I do think that the simplicity of the equations and
diagrams do provide an effective way of highlighting the literary arguments in the
text and of illuminating the mechanism that links federalism and individual liberty.
Another serious limitation of the analysis concerns the empirical value of the
theoretical insights offered in this paper. Other than a sketchy comparison between
the USA and the European Union with respect to the mobility of citizens, I have not
provided empirical considerations of any sort here, the focus of analysis being
exclusively of a theoretical nature.
Lastly, since exit costs mainly result from habitual behavior and routines
generated by particular political institutions, the analysis is mostly valid in the long
run. In other words, the time horizon for which the analysis is applicable cannot be
the short run, since exit costs depend on the adaptation of the behavioral routines of
the citizens, which need considerable time to take place. Besides, exit cost effects of
institutional diversity will obviously vary with age and income, a dimension that is
not captured by the analysis.
10 Conclusion
My concluding remarks can be brief. I have shown that federalism has an
ambivalent overall effect on individual liberty. I have indicated two effects, one
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direct and one indirect. A complete treatment of the relationship between federalism
and individual liberty should consider both effects. The optimum range of diversity
of jurisdictions, i.e., of federalism, has been shown to lie where the two effects
counterbalance each other. Increased mobility or adaptability of citizens can lead to
a more effective realization of individual liberty.
It is obvious that this analysis holds irrespective of which form of federalism—
dual, cooperative or competitive—is assumed. As long as federalism is understood
as the constitutional principle of noncentralization of power, the analysis likewise
holds. A further insight concerns the application of federalist structures on polities
with different degrees of cultural homogeneity and thus citizen-mobility. These
results should have profound consequences for the ongoing debate on the
prospective of the European Union.
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